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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The findings of fact of the trial court, not the decision o
the Court of Appeals as asserted by the Respondent, should b
viewed with a presumption of correcthess.

Rule 52(a) of the Uta

Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial court's finding
of fact should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
POINT II|
The trial court f s finding of testamentary intent and refusa
to find a lack of testamentary capacity should not be overturne
because the evidence does not clearly preponderate against th
trial court? s findings.

The burden of proof regarding testamen

tary intent and testamentary capacity is on the party challengin
a will, and the personal representative failed to meet that burde
of proof.
The trial court refused to make a finding of fact regardin
the decedent's alleged preparation of "formal" wills for famil
members, and that refusal is not clear error.

Even if the cour

had made such a finding, the alleged preparation of "formal" will
does not demonstrate a lack of testamentary

intent to make

holographic will because it does not relate to decedent's belief
as to the requirements of a holographic will.

The trial cour

made no finding of fact based on the testimony of decedent'
daughter that decedent would at later times prepare more forma
documents from cards similar to the holographic document, and th
failure to make such a finding is not clear error.
1

Even if th

decedent did intend to make a formal will at a later date, the
decedent could still possess testamentary intent regarding the
holographic document, and the trial court's finding of testamentary intent is not clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence.
The personal representative would have failed to meet its
burden of proof regarding a lack of testamentary capacity even if
the trial court had accepted all of the personal representative's
evidence because that evidence at best only inferred that the
decedent had been drinking when the holographic document was
written.

No evidence was presented that the decedent was drunk

or intoxicated or that the decedent lacked any of the specific
elements of testamentary capacity.
POINT III
The fact that the decedent did not dispose of all his property
by the holographic documents does not invalidate the will.

The

Utah Uniform Probate Code authorizes the probate of more than one
will and authorizes partial intestate dispositions, demonstrating
a clear legislative intent to allow partial testamentary dispositions.
No evidence supports the personal representative's assertion
that the cards to the will may have been prepared at separate
times.

Even if the cards were prepared at different dates, the

cards would be valid as a holographic will because they meet the
Utah holographic will requirements. Later additions to holographic wills should be allowed without the necessity of resigning the
2

will because the additions can adopt the prior signature.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Standard Of Review Of The Court Of Appealsf Decision Se
Out By The Personal Representative Is Incorrect.
This Court has held that on appeal, the evidence and judgmen

of the trial court should be viewed in the light most favorabl
to the prevailing party, that the judgment of the trial court b
afforded a presumption of correctness, and that the trial cour
be affirmed if supported by competent evidence.
v. Rocky Point Ditch Co.,

See, e.g., Swase

660 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983) at 225-226

The personal representative has cited two cases in his brief a
supporting his position that the decision of the Court of Appeal
should be presumed proper, and that its ruling should stand unles
deemed arbitrary and capricious. Both of these cases were decide
before the existence of the Utah Court of Appeals and actuall
support a presumption in favor of the trial court.
Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, 636 P.2d

487 (Utah 1981),

In Lith
the cour

stated that it "indulges the findings and judgment of the tria
court with a presumption of validity and correctness . . . ". Th
case does not involve the review of an intermediate appellat
court decision in any way.

In Peatross v. Board of Commissioner

of Salt Lake County, 555 P. 2d 281 (Utah 1976), the second cas
cited by the personal representative, the court was reviewing th
decision of a district court that the appellant was not entitle
to a trial de novo from a decision of the Board of Commissioner
of Salt Lake County.

The court stated that the reviewing cour

3

(the district court) should not upset the actions of the lower
tribunal (the Board of Commissioners) unless the tribunal exceeded
its authority or acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

The

case does not support the position of the personal representative
for at least two reasons.
standard

deals with

First, the arbitrary and capricious

the review

of

rather than a judicial decision.

an administrative

decision

Second, even if the standard did

apply, it is the trial court, not the Court of Appeals, that is
most analogous to the Board of Commissioners' role of being the
initial finder of fact; thus Peatross supports deference toward
the trial court's findings, not the Court of Appeals.
This Court can review the record from a position equal to that
of the Court of Appeals, while the trial court was in the unique
position of being able to view

the witnesses, evaluate

their

credibility, and determine the proper weight to be given to the
evidence.

Rule

52(a) of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

provides "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses."

See also Sweeney Land

Company v. Gilbert, 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah February 9, 1990).
Thus, it is the trial court's findings of fact, including its
findings that the decedent intended the document to be his will
and that the handwritten name constitutes the decedent's signature
(R. 122-125), not the Court of Appeals' reversal, that should be
viewed with a presumption of correctness.
4

II.

The Personal Representative Failed To Meet Its Burden 0
Proof To Show A Lack Of Testamentary Intent Or Testamen
tary Capacity.
The personal representative's brief raises the issues c

testamentary intent, and, indirectly, testamentary capacity, whic
were not addressed by the Court of Appeals in its decision in thi
case.

Whether or not a decedent has testamentary intent ar

testamentary capacity in writing and signing a holographic wil
is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court.

Unde

Utah Code Ann. §75-3-407 (1978), the personal representative i
this case has the burden of proof regarding testamentary inter
and capacity.

"Contestants of a will have the burden of es

tablishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity .
Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters wit
respect to which they have the initial burden of proof."

Ic

This Court has held on numerous occasions that it will reverse c
the facts only when the evidence clearly preponderates against t\
findings of the trial court.

See, e.g., Crimmins v. Simonds, 6^

P.2d 478 (Utah 1981); Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utc
1981).

It is the trial court's privilege to be the exclusi^

judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to t
given to the evidence.

DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P..

290, 293 (1962), cert, denied 371 U.S. 821 (1962).

The trie

court is not required to find evidence is persuasive even whei
the evidence is uncontradicted.

Super Tire Market, Inc. ^

Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966).

5

A.

Testamentary Intent,

In the present case, the holographic document and the circumstances
intent.

support

the trial

court's

finding

of

testamentary

The document is titled "Last Will & Test" and provides,

"I, Robert E. Erickson, do hereby state that I leave and bequeath
to the following persons of my family and others . . . ."

(3-P).

The document then makes specific gifts of personal property to the
decedent's wife and children and to Mr. Misaka.
to

Mr. Misaka

involve

property

in which

decedent had joint business interests.

(3-P).

The gifts

Mr. Misaka

and

the

(R. 75-81, R. 133-134).

Thus, the language of the document and the surrounding circumstances show strong evidence of an intent by the decedent to make a
testamentary gift.
The personal representative presented evidence and has argued
several

grounds

in its brief

testamentary intent.

regarding

a showing

of

lack of

None of those grounds, either by themselves

or in combination, show error by the trial court in finding the
existence of testamentary intent.
1.
The

Other Wills.

personal

representative

presented

testimony

from

the

decedent's daughter that the decedent had prepared wills for other
members of his family (R. 153-154), and presented into

-'idence

wills (the "family wills") allegedly prepared by decedei

The

trial court made no finding of fact as to whether or i

the

decedent had prepared the family wills, and rejected the pei onal
representative's proposed findings of fact which contained that

6

finding.

(R. 115).

The evidence before the trial court wc

sufficiently unpersuasive to justify the trial court's refusal t
find that decedent had prepared the family wills. The decedent'
daughter had a direct financial interest in the case, and r
foundation was given to show the basis of her assertions (R. 115'
Further, nothing contained in the family wills shows that tt
decedent prepared them (4-D).

Given the failure of the persons

representative to present any evidence other than decedent'
daughter's bare allegations that the decedent prepared the fami]
wills, it was within the trial court's discretion to determir
that the evidence was not credible and would be given little c
no weight.
Even if the testator had prepared "formal" wills for oth<=
persons, it would not be inconsistent with preparing a holograph!
will for himself.
other

states

The laws of Utah and most, if not all, of tY

allow

for holographic

wills, and

many states

including Utah, allow such a will where it is not signed at th
end*

Given those laws, it is unreasonable to infer that

testator did not intend to make a holographic will simply becaus
he may have had knowledge of the requirements of non-holographi
wills.
The only legal authority cited by the personal representati\.
on this proposition is In re Hughes1 Estate, 140 Cal. App. 97, 2
P.2d 204 (1934), which is distinguishable on its facts.

Hughe

involved two purported holographic wills drafted by the decedent
The earlier document was "drawn with much technical detail ar
7

care, " while the later document was in the form of a short letter
which ended "My will is in my safe box in Oakland Bank."
205.

Ld. at

The court stated that it was significant that both documents

were hologrciphic wills because the technical detail and care shown
in the first holographic will showed "a belief in the testator of
the necessity of a formal document to effect a disposition of his
estate."
the

Id..

second

This was a factor, together with the reference in

document

to

the

location

of

decedent's

will

and

extraneous circumstances, which the court used in determining that
the testator did not intend for the second document to be a will.
In

the

present

case,

the

testator's

alleged

preparation

of

"formal" wills for other family members provides no evidence of
the testator's belief as to the requirements of holographic wills,
and therefore does not provide evidence

supporting

a lack of

testamentary intent.
2.
The

Drafts.

personal

representative

presented

testimony

from

the

decedent's daughter that the decedent would prepare typewritten
documents and letters from notes made on 3" x 5" cards.
156).
of

<9. 155-

The trial court's finding of testamentary intent in spite

that testimony

reasons.

is not clearly

erroneous

for

at

least

two

First, the trial court's refusal to make a finding of

fact on this matter is not clearly erroneous because no foundation
was given for the testimony of decedent's daughter, an interested
party,

and

no

direct

evidence

was

testator's intent in the present case.

8

presented

regarding

the

Second, even if the trial

court had accepted the evidence presented, the evidence at besonly infers that the decedent may have intended to later prepare
a typewritten will, and such an inference does not refute the
testamentary intent of the holographic document in question.

Ai

intent to later prepare a more formal document does not preclude
or detract from a finding of testamentary intent in regard to ai
earlier document.

In re Kuttler's Estate, 160 Cal. App.2d 322

325 P.2d 624, 631 (1958); Richberg v. Robbins, 33 Tenn. App. 66
228 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1950); and In re Estate of Teubert, 29!
S.E.2d 456, 461 (W.Va. 1982).
B.

Testamentary Capacity.

The personal representative presented testimony from decedent's daughter that the decedent would prepare 3" x 5" cards
after drinking, that decedent's handwriting would change aftei
drinking, and that decedent's spelling would deteriorate aftei
drinking.

The

trial

court's

failure

to

accept

the evidence

presented and the inference that decedent was drinking at the time
of the execution of the holographic document was not clearly
erroneous.

The only evidence presented

decedent's daughter, an interested party.

was the testimony oJ
No direct evidence was

presented that decedent had been drinking at the time he wrote the
holographic document.

Further, even assuming decedent had beer

drinking when he wrote the holographic document, no evidence was
presented that decedent was intoxicated to the point of lackinc
testamentary capacity.

The decedent's daughter did not testify

that the decedent was drunk or intoxicated and her testimony die
9

not address any of the standards related to testamentary capacity.
Instead, all of the decedent's daughter's testimony related only
to "drinking" by the decedent (R. 156-160).

When specifically

cross-examined by opposing counsel, the decedent's daughter was
unable to testify that decedent was drunk or intoxicated:
Q.

Can you san that every time he wrote on
those index cards and made little notes to
himself that he was drunk?

A.

I can say there are times I saw him write
on index cards he had been drinking.

(R. 160, lines 13-17).
The standard for testamentary capacity is that the testator
must know the natural objects of his bounty, be able to recall
his property, and have capacity to intelligently and voluntarily
form a plan of disposition.

In re Holten's Estate, 17 Utah 2d

29, 404 P.2d 27, 29 (1965).

Drinking by itself does not render

a person incompetent to make a will; instead, the proper question
is whether

the person possessed

the elements

capacity.

See Paskvan v. Mesich,

455 P. 2d

of
229,

testamentary
234

(Alaska

1969), In re Kraft's Estate, 374 P.2d 413, 415-416 (Alaska 1962).
The personal representative did not present evidence relating
to decedent's lack of the specific requirements of testamentary
capacity.
decedent's

Given

the

daughter's

failure

to present

testimony

inferring

evidence
that

other

decedent

than
might

have been "drinking," the personal representative failed to meet
its burden of proof as to the issue of testamentary capacity.
The trial court's refusal to find a lack of testamentary capacity

10

should not be overturned because the evidence does not clearl
preponderate against the trial court.
III.

The Form of the Holographic Documents Does Not Negat
Its Validity.
Point

I.D

of Mr. Misaka f s

(Petitioner's)

brief

addresse

issues related to the form of the hdlographic document raised 1
the Court of Appeals decision.

The personal representative'

brief raises further issues related to the form of the documen
which are addressed below.
A.

Partial Disposition of Property.

The personal representative asserts that the will should b
invalid because it does not contain a residuary clause or make
complete disposition of the decedent's property.

Utah Code Ann

§§75-3-410 and 411 (1978) recognize that a will need not dispos
of the testator's entire estate, aqd provide the proper manne
for

the

determination

portion of the estate.

of

the

beneficiaries

of

the

remaimn

Section 75-3-410 provides that more tha

one will may be probated where neither will expressly revokes th
other or contains provisions which work as a total revocation b
implication.

Section 75-3-411 provides, "If it becomes eviden

in the course of a formal testacy proceeding that, though one o
more

instruments

are entitled

to be probated,

the decedent'

estate is or may be partially intestate, the court shall enter a
order to that effect."

These provisions clearly show that unde

the Utah Uniform Probate Code a will is not invalid because I
fails to dispose of all of the property of the testator, an<

11

demonstrates a legislative intent to allow partial testamentary
dispositions,

refuting

the

personal

representative's

argument

that it is against public policy to distribute part of an estate
under a will and the remainder by intestate succession.

In the

present case, Utah Code Ann. §75-3-410 (1978) allows the prior
will of the decedent to remain in effect regarding the property
not disposed of by the holographic will.

The language of §75-3-

410 also refutes the personal representative's argument that a
provision revoking prior wills is a formal requirement for making
a will.
B.

Time Period When Document Was Prepared.

The personal representative argues that "no one knows when
the cards were prepared or even if they were prepared at the same
time."

The personal representative presented no evidence that

the cards were prepared

at different

times, and

presented

no

support for the legal proposition that the cards would be invalid
as a will if they were prepared at different times.

The expert

witness presented by Mr. Misaka testified that the cards were
written within as narrow a time frame as could be determined by
forensic science.

(R. 145-146).

The expert witness did

not

testify that the cards were prepared four to six months apart,
but instead stated that the field of forensic science is only
exact enough to be able to determine from handwriting

whether

documents were written within a four to six month period.
145-146).

(R.

Thus, the evidence clearly supports a finding that the

cards were prepared at the same time.
12

Even assuming the cards were written at different dates, thi
Court should find that as a matter of law the cards are valid a
a holographic will.

The holographic document is entirely ii

decedent's handwriting and contains decedent's signature.
Point I of petitioner's brief.

Se<

Given the Uniform Probate Code':

stated intention of validating wills wherever possible, addition;
to a will at a later time should not invalidate the will if i"
otherwise meets the requirements of a holographic will.

Sec

General Comment to Part 5 of Article II, Official Comments to the
Uniform Probate Code.

Further, the case law of other states

allows additions to be made to a holographic will at a later date
without the necessity of resigning the will on the theory thai
the old signature is adopted and the several writings are integrated into one document.

See Randall v. Salvation Army, IOC

Nev. 466, 686 P.2d 241 (1984); In re Dumas' Estate, 34 Cal. 2c
406, 210 P.2d 697 (1949); Succession of Guiraud, 164 La. 610, 114
So. 489, 490 (1927); LaRue v. Lee, 63 W.Va. 388, 60 S.E. 388, 39C
(1908).
Respectfully submitted this

day of March, 1990.

WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN

yOb*~

KEN P. JONES
Attorneys rxir Petitioner,
Tatsumi Misaka
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